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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES.

By Winifred

R. Brown. Washington, D.C.: The Federal Judicial Center, 1981.
Pp. ix, 140.
Reviewed by Jeffrey A. Parness*

In the 1979 Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary'
Chief Justice Burger called for a fresh look at the entire federal
rulemaking process. Following the Chief Justice's lead, the Federal
Judicial Center' responded with a report by Winifred R. Brown
3 In a
entitled Federal Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities.
4
foreward to that report Professor A. Leo Levin, the Federal Judicial Center's director, discouraged any attempt to intiate "a thorough review of the strengths and weaknesses of the process," and
advised the author instead to focus "on those aspects of the process that had been singled out for criticism and that might benefit
from change."' 5 Thus, the stated purpose of this "catalog of criticism" was "to ensure that all views of even potential merit are
brought to the attention of policymakers."'
Unfortunately, the ensuing report only partially completes its
defined mission. Nonetheless, policymakers are likely to give the
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University, 1982-1983. B.A., 1970, Colby College;
J.D., 1974, University of Chicago.
1. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1979,65 A.B.A. J. 358 (1979).
2. Congress charged the Judicial Conference of the United States with carrying on "a
continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure
...
prescribed by the Supreme Court," and making recommendations on rule and statutory
changes compelled by such study. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Congress charged
the Federal Judicial Center with recommending to the Judicial Conference changes relevant
to the "improvement of the administration and management of the courts of the United
States," as well as providing research assistance to the Conference and its committees. Id. §
620.
3.

W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND PossmIBrMrs vi (1981).

4. Professor Levin was an early contributor on the topic of judicial rulemaking. See
Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958).
5. W. BROWN, supra note 3, at vii.
6. Id. at 35.
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report serious consideration despite several crucial omissions in the

report's discussion of federal rulemaking. Moreover, because improvements, or at least changes, in federal rulemaking are likely to
be forthcoming, this Review outlines some of the deficiencies in the
Judicial Center's report in the hope of prompting policymakers to
consider a wider catalog of criticisms.
I.
Brown divides the report into three major parts. The first part
examines the existing structure and process by which federal rule
changes are now drafted, reviewed, and promulgated. 7 In her discussion of the rulemaking structure, Brown properly focuses on the
role of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Judicial Conference (the Standing Committee), together with its various advisory committees. The advisory committees of the Standing Committee, after all, initiate and
institute most of the rule changes made. Brown also briefly discusses the roles of the United States Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress. The report's discussion of the
rulemaking process likewise centers upon the advisory committees.
It gives particular consideration to the role of committee reporters,
committee membership, committee meetings, committee notes,
and the manner in which the committees receive public input on
rule changes under consideration. While this examination of the
rulemaking structure and process serves chiefly as background to
the report's later criticism of present rulemaking practices, it also
provides information on federal judicial rulemaking that outsiders
have found difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.8 In the report
many of us learn for the first time about some of the specific comments and proposals suggested at a 1979 conference on federal
rulemaking.9 The report also contains bits and pieces of information on federal rulemaking gleaned from Brown's search of the files
of the Administrative Office of United States Courts. 10
The second major part of the report presents the problems,
7. Id. at 5-34.
8. The difficulty of locating information on federal judicial rulemaking is not surprising. As Professor Lesnick once noted: "What we know about the method by which rules are

drafted and considered comes largely from speeches or articles by judges active in the work
of the Judicial Conference." Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Reexamination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 580 (1975).

9. W.
10.

BROWN,

supra note 3, at ix, 4.

Id. at 15 n.30, 22 n.50.
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criticisms, and proposals for reform of federal rulemaking, paying
particular attention to the developments of recent years.," Brown
bases this presentation on three principal sources: (1) law review
articles, mainly by those in academia; (2) Congressional proposals;
and (3) Dean Roger C. Cramton's 1979 "think piece" for the Federal Judicial Center, and its reception during a one day discussion. 12 Though these sources provide extensive review of recent
proposals for reforming the rulemaking structure and process, they
fail to review similar developments in state rulemaking processes.
This failure is regrettable since recent state endeavors provide additional insights into the problems of rulemaking and their possible solutions.1 3
Before presenting these criticisms and proposals, Brown offers
several troubling observations." First, Brown dismisses many criticisms of the present rulemaking policies because the critics' suggestions are either "fundamental suggestions for change by reallocating authority,"' 5 debated and resolved long ago, or proposals for
changes that "constitute relatively minor adjustments in the overall process."'" Of course, reliance on debates of long ago hardly
constitutes a "fresh look" at federal rulemaking. Moreover, if one
assumes that the current proposals for changes in federal judicial
rulemaking call for only minor revisions,' 7 one must seriously question whether these proposals satisfactorily address the need for improvement in the rulemaking process. Brown also suggests that the
states' emulation of the federal rules "offers eloquent testimony to
their fundamental success in achieving fair and effective proce11. Id. at 35-102.
12. Id. at 2-4.

13. See, e.g.,
and

amended June

NEVADA RULES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE DocKET (adopted June 7, 1978,
16, 1978); RULE ON PROCEDURAL RULES, ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND AD-

MINISTRATIVE ORDERS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT

generally, C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI & C.

(adopted Mar. 15, 1978). See

GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING IN THE STATE COURTS:

A

COMPENDIUM (1978); Parness & Manthey, Public Process and State JudicialRulemaking, 1
PACE L. REV. 121 (1980).
14. W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 35-36.

15. Id. at 35.
16.

Id. at 36.

17. The assumption that pending proposals call for only minor adjustments is itself
quite debatable. Compare Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1290-91
(1978) (finding that most people familiar with procedural law, including Judge Weinstein
and Professor Lesnick, generally approve of the national rulemaking process) with Wright,
Book Review, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 652, 653 (1978) (finding much force in the suggestion by

Professor Clinton that recent national rulemaking has entered into "controversial, uncharted areas of law" and is likely to create sufficient pressure to generate some congressional response).
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dure." 18 Yet one must differentiate rules from rulemaking. While
rules resulting in fair and effective procedure constitute evidence
of fair and effective rulemaking, the evidence does not necessarily
support a conclusion that the entire rulemaking process is fair and
effective. Benefits may result from improving the openness of a
rulemaking mechanism that already produces rules achieving fair
and effective procedure; at the least, the process might utilize democratic principles. 19 State emulation of the federal rules also may
cause state inattention to state rulemaking mechanisms, thus causing difficulties during state rule promulgations for which no federal
model exists. 0
The third and most disappointing part of the report attempts
to examine critically some of the proposals for changing the federal
rulemaking process. The report provides little examination of any
proposals regarding the "judicial-legislative relationship,"2 perhaps because by the time the author reaches her conclusion, she is
concerned with only suggestions regarding Judicial Conference action 2 2-not suggestions regarding "the entire rulemaking process."" The report does examine various proposals to modify the
structure of the rulemaking mechanism;' these include proposals
that would eliminate Supreme Court participation and proposals
that would establish an independent Rulemaking Commission.
This examination, however, is incomplete, for it fails to weigh the
benefits and disadvantages of the particular proposals. Brown's review of the proposals for changes in the federal rulemaking process
includes topics such as the timing and extent of public notice of
suggested rule changes; the accessability to the public of
rulemakers' deliberations on possible rule changes; the opportunity
for interested persons to have input into the decisions; the need for
more comprehensive comments or notes accompanying significant
18. W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 35.
19. Parness & Manthey, supra note 13, at 130-31. Other benefits of a more fair and
open process include the likelihood that more input will lead to better rules and to increased
public acceptance of any rules promulgated. Id. at 131-32.
20. State judicial rulemaking authority often extends to areas not subject to federal

judicial rulemaking. See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973) (amended 1979) (judicial conduct); OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSMILITY (1970) (amended 1979) (regulation of the practice of law); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 436 (1972) (court boundaries); id. tit. 12.
App. VIII, A.O. 2 (Supp. 1982) (court boundaries).
21. See W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 40, 86-102.
22. See id. at 134-35.
23. But cf. id. at vi (which suggests a need for examination of the entire federal
rulemaking process).
24. Id. at 108-17.
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rule changes; and the need for the establishment and publication
of procedures for rule changes. Brown's analysis of these proposals
though, like the discussion of the proposals for changes in
rulemaking structure, fails to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the suggested changes.
The report's failure to critique the proposals it reviews, however, is neither surprising nor disturbing. Indeed, if the report's
objective is to initiate a "fresh look" at federal rulemaking, the
Federal Judicial Center is wise to wait before committing itself to
positions on the judicial-legislative relationship, structure, and
process best suited for federal rulemaking. A crucial flaw in the
report, however, is its failure to include or suggest additional criticisms of the current rulemaking mechanism. Indeed, the proper
authorities will not have the opportunity to examine all views of
potential merit if studies such as the Federal Judicial Center report fail to make a comprehensive review of relevant criticism and
to identify previously unrecognized problems.
II.
Not only does Brown fail to raise new issues in the rulemaking
reform debate, but she fails to address significantly at least four
important aspects of federal rulemaking: (1) The continuing vitality of the division between procedural and substantive rules; (2)
the relationship between local rules promulgated by individual
courts and rules promulgated by the Supreme Court; (3) the de
jure and de facto promulgation of procedural rules outside the
Rules Enabling Act; 25 and (4) the possible unconstitutionality of

the present federal rulemaking processes.
Pursuant to statute, the United States Supreme Court may issue rules of procedure used in civil actions and cases applying admiralty, maritime, and bankruptcy laws.26 These rules, however,
may not "abridge, enlarge or modify a litigant's substantive
rights.

'2 7

This restriction on changing substantive rights requires

the troublesome distinction between acceptable federal rules affecting the substantive rights of litigants and unacceptable federal
rules operating to change the litigants' rights.2 8 This distinction
between "affecting" and "changing" is necessary because Congress
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976).
26. Id. §§ 2072, 2075 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
27. Id.
28. The Supreme Court imposed this requirement in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941).
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foresaw that "most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of the litigants," and thus
it intended to allow the rules to have "incidental effects" on substantive rights that necessarily attend the adoption of prescribed
new rules.29
This distinction is not only difficult to apply, but it apparently
does not cover all federal rules that the Supreme Court may prescribe. For example, legislative recognition of Supreme Court authority regarding amendments to the evidence rules,3 0 rules for the
conduct of its own business," and rules in criminal cases and proceedings to punish for criminal contempt of court 2 contains no
comparable restriction regarding change in substantive rights. Furthermore, while Congress restricts the Supreme Court's power to
prescribe national rules of procedure to those rules that do not
change substantive rights, supplementary local court rules apparently operate under no similar restriction. 3 Surely a "fresh look"
at the federal rulemaking system requires an examination of the
substance-procedure dichotomy, its clarity, and the consistency of
its application.
Even assuming the articulation of a more consistent substance-procedure dichotomy capable of easy application, the propriety of maintaining such a dichotomy in contemporary congressional grants of judicial rulemaking authority is questionable. A
grant of judicial authority to make rules of court that change certain substantive rights may not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. In fact, substantive rulemaking
has occurred already in the federal judicial system with respect to
the regulation of the practice of law.3 5 Moreover, certain states
have expressly provided for judicial regulation of substantive rights
29.

Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (relying on Sibbach,

312 U.S. at 11-14). For illustrations of how procedural rules affect, if not change, substantive
rights, see R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 75-104 (1979).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
31. Id. § 2071 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
32. Id. § 3771.
33. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) with id. § 2071.
34. Admittedly, the nondelegation doctrine of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) may be
making a comeback. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 664 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part), 672-75

(Rehnquist, J., concurring). But see Parness, The Legislative Roles in Florida'sJudicial
Rulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 359 (1981).
35. See, e.g., SIXTH CIR. R. 6; SIXTH CIR. RuLEs OF DIScIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT; ELEVENTH CR. R. 7(c).
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in that area." Perhaps an admission that judicially crafted rules
change substantive rights should be forthcoming, with an admonition that these rules must arise from a desire to regulate
37

procedure.

Beside the Supreme Court's national rulemaking authority,
lower federal courts have statutory and other bases of authority for
the promulgation of local rules. These local rules govern local court
"practice" 38 or the "conduct of [the court's] business,"39 and must
be consistent with the high court's national rules. 40 Any reexami-

nation of federal rulemaking at the national level must include
consideration of the relationship between local rules and national
rules. The widespread use of local rulemaking raises questions such
as: What rules are best promulgated at the local rather than the
national level? 41 What mechanisms will assure that local rules are
and remain consistent with national rules? 4 2 Is the scope of local

court rulemaking in some ways broader than that of national
rulemaking?' 3 The negative impact of local rules on the national
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court has been the topic of
lively discussion for at least the past few years," and, thus, its ab36. See, e.g., ARK.CONST. amend. XXVIH; OHIO CONST. art. IV,§ 2(B)(g); PA. CONST.
art. V, § 10(c).
37. Consider civil limitations periods designed to preclude the need for judicial consideration of stale claims, and local trial court rules regarding the prompt disposition of criminal cases. See United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 83; FED. R. App. P. 47.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
40. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 83; FED. R. App. P. 47.
41. Consider, however, certain rules regarding judicial discipline over which national
(Judicial Conference) and local (judicial council of a circuit) rulemaking bodies share authority. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11) (Supp. IV 1980). For a view on the abuse of local rulemaking
power, see 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152 (1973)
(noting many local rules either are invalid on their face or intrude unwisely into areas that
should be dealt with on a national basis by rules made by the Supreme Court).
42. Two distinguished authors have proposed limiting local rules to a few specific areas, or requiring Judicial Conference approval of local rules. See C. WIGHT & A. MILLm,
supra note 41, § 3152. But see Flanders, In Praise of Local Rules, 62 JUmICATURE 28, 33
(1978).
43. For a suggestion that the scope of local court rulemaking is broader, see Proceedings of a Session of the Conference of Metropolitan Chief Judges on Rules and Rulemaking, 79 F.R.D. 471, 479 (1978) (remarks of Judge Joiner) [hereinafter cited as Conference].
44. Earlier comments include Note, Rule 83 and the Local FederalRules, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 1251 (1967); Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedurein the FederalDistrict
Courts-A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011. More recent comments include Conference, supra
note 43; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 41; Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of
Local Rules and Practicesin View of Proposed Changes to the FederalRules, 63 MINN.L.
REv. 253 (1979); Flanders, Local Rules in FederalDistrict Courts: Usurpation,Legislation,
or Information?, 14 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. (1981); Weinstein, Reform of FederalCourt Rulemak-
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sence from the Federal Judicial Center's report is quite surprising.
Further, the report fails to address the de jure and de facto
promulgation of rules outside the Enabling Act. Regarding certain
rules, such as those promulgated by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,45 the omission is not
critical. The omission of far reaching court rules found in neither
the federal nor the local rules, however, is more serious. District
courts4 6 and courts of appeals 47 have the authority "in all cases not
provided for by rule," for example, to "regulate their practice in
any manner not inconsistent with" the prevailing national rules.
Likewise, many local courts operate under standing or general orders regarding court procedure, which are not found in the local
rules and which are often difficult to obtain.48
Moreover, a substantial number of national rules are adopted
outside the Enabling Act by congressional action and judicial precedent. Examples of legislatively enacted rules include provisions
on venue,49 interpleader, 0 personal jurisdiction, 5 and perhaps
even subject matter jurisdiction. 52 While the constitutionality of
congressional rulemaking is beyond dispute, a "fresh look" at federal rulemaking should include an investigation into the continuing
need to include substantial numbers of procedural guidelines in
both statutory and rule form. After all, one reason Congress passed
the Enabling Act was to eliminate "the necessity of searching in
two places, namely in the Acts of Congress and in the rules of the
courts, for procedural prerequisites." 53 The courts also promulgate
rules of procedure outside the Enabling Act by way of judicial decisions which never find their way into formal rules. Examples of
these include precedents regarding the prudential aspects of standing Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905 (1976).
45. See id. § 604(e) (1976); see also id. § 372(c)(11) (Supp. IV 1980) (rulemaking by
the United States Judicial Conference and circuit judicial councils authorized).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
47. FED. R. App. P. 47.
48. Conference, supra note 43, at 481-82.
49. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976) (general venue statute); cf. OHIo R. Civ. P. 3
(procedural rule on venue).
50. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (procedural rule on interpleader in addition to the statutory device of interpleader).
51. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(e), 2361 (1976) (service of process on nonresidents); cf.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 4(e) (procedural rule on service on nonresidents).
52. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (general diversity statute); cf. Shapiro, Diversity
Jurisdiction,91 HARv. L. REV. 317, 344-45 (1977) (suggesting that rules on subject-matter
jurisdiction are procedural).
53. United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1104 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 Legislative History of Title 28 1895, 1896 (1948)).
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ing54 and abstention.5 5 Again, a truly fresh look into federal
rulemaking should encompass an inquiry into the problems created
by maintaining two sources of judicial law on procedure. For example, no opportunity for broad public input exists when courts develop procedural law by precedent, and the difficult determination
of which aspects of procedure are best governed by only precedent,
by only rule, or by both precedent and rule remains unresolved.
Last, the report does not discuss the implications of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,51 in which the Court held that the right to attend criminal
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment.57 While
the decision did not create a right to attend civil trials" or a right
of access to nonadjudicatory judicial functions, its rationale apparently would support a right of access to most judicial rulemaking
proceedings. These rationales include "assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government," 59 aiding the goal of accurate factfinding,60 and promoting
the conviction among the citizenry that "they are governed equitably."6 1 The Court's reasoning applies at least as well to judicial
rulemaking proceedings as it does to civil trials and, thus, public
input into or at least public knowledge of the rulemaking process
may rise to the level of a constitutional guarantee. Therefore,
many of the current rulemaking procedures that exclude the public
2
may violate the first amendment.
54. See, eg., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 513-14 (1975) ("prudential considerations"
serve as counsel to a decision on standing); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (noting
the uncertainty caused by the blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations in the doctrine of justiciability). For a discussion on the potential abuses in utilizing
the present approach to standing, see Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power
Case, 58 Tax. L. Rav. 273 (1980). For a review of some of the problems that arise when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are used in standing cases, see Bernstine, A "Standing"
Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 WASH. U.L.Q. 501 (1979).
55. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For one recommendation that the abstention doctrine be codified, see AMICAN LAW INsTITUTE, STUDY OF Tim
DIVIsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 48-50 (1969). The study

bases its recommendation on the present "uncertainty as to when a state or a federal court
is the proper forum for a case." Id. at 283.
56. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
57. Id. at 580.
58. Though such an asserted right was not involved, the Court seemed to indicate
forthcoming approval of any such later assertion. Id. at 580 n.17.
59. Id. at 575.
60. Id. at 595-96 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. For a review of the implications of Richmond on federal judicial rulemaking, see
Parness & Copeland, Access to Judicial Rulemaking Procedures, 1982 Amz. ST. L.J.
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III.

Despite these omissions, the Federal Judicial Center's report
on federal rulemaking undoubtedly will receive serious consideration during the forthcoming debates on the mechanisms for
promulgating rules applicable to the Article III federal courts.
While Chief Justice Burger prompted the report by calling for a
"fresh look" at the entire rulemaking process, the Center's response constitutes only a somewhat flawed look at part of that process. If the federal rulemaking system is to receive a "fresh look"
and benefit from the examination, the examination of the system
must extend beyond the existing procedures utilized by the Judicial Conference, its committees, and the Supreme Court. Brown's
report for the Federal Judicial Center fails to do so.

(forthcoming).

